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NOTES
United States v. Hyppolit. The Police Cannot Search Your
House Because of the Way You Assert Your Constitutional
Rights ... or Can They?
One of law's fundamental principles is that rights are lost by dis-
use. For example, property owners who do not assert their rights can
lose their property to adverse possessors.' Similarly, litigants waive
some defenses if they do not plead them,2 and can also lose the right
to appeal errors if they do not object to them at trial.3 Furthermore,
statutes of limitations prevent litigants from waiting too long to bring
legal claims.4 Because the law requires many rights to be asserted in
order to avoid losing them, it would follow that citizens should not be
penalized for asserting their constitutional rights
In United States v. Hyppolite,6 the Court of Appeals for the
1. See 10 BUDDY O. H. HERRING ET AL., THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 87.01
(David A. Thomas ed., 1994) (describing the origin and nature of the doctrine of adverse
possession); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-40 (1983) (codifying adverse possession); Walls
v. Groham, 315 N.C. 239, 249, 337 S.E.2d 556, 562 (1985) (stating that persons who meet
all of the requirements for adverse possession can claim title).
2. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h) (listing defenses waived if not pled); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 12(f) (stating the effect of failing to raise defenses prior to trial).
3. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1446(b) (1988) ("Failure to make an appropri-
ate and timely motion or objection constitutes a waiver of the right to assert the alleged
error upon appeal, but the appellate court may review such errors affecting substantial
rights in the interest of justice .... "); United States v. Jones, 404 F. Supp. 529, 539 (E.D.
Pa.) ("In the absence of plain error, matters not called to the attention of the judge can-
not be subsequently raised in the post trial stages of the proceeding."), affd, 538 F.2d 321
(3d Cir. 1976).
4. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1994) ("[A] civil action arising under an Act of Con-
gress ... may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-46 to -47 (1983) (setting ten years as the limitation to an action upon
a judgment); id. § 1-52 (1983 & Supp. 1995) (setting three year statute of limitations for
various civil actions).
5. Cf Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) ("[W]e find it intolerable
that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.");
H. Richard Uviller, Self-Incrimination by Inference: Constitutional Restrictions on the
Evidentiary Use of a Suspect's Refusal to Submit to a Search, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 37, 40 (1990) (arguing that if a person loses Fifth Amendment rights as a
result of asserting his Fourth Amendment right to refuse to consent to a search, it is un-
constitutional to allow a decision-maker to infer that the person's refusal was the result of
a guilty conscience).
6. 65 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1158 (1996).
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Fourth Circuit considered whether the manner in which a suspect in a
criminal investigation asserts his constitutional rights is sufficient to
establish probable cause7 for a warrant to search the suspect's home.'
Recognizing that citizens should not be penalized for asserting their
rights, the court held that the manner in which an individual asserts
his rights cannot be the sole basis for probable cause for a search
warrant.9 Nevertheless, the court ultimately held that even though a
search warrant solely based on the manner in which an individual as-
serts his constitutional rights is invalid under the Fourth Amendment,
the evidence did not have to be suppressed because the seizure came
within the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule."
After summarizing the facts, procedural history, and holding of
Hyppolite," this Note examines two lines of case law which inter-
sected in the Hyppolite decision. First, the Note discusses the scant
case law which concludes that a person should not be penalized for
asserting her constitutional rights." Second, the Note explains the
exclusionary rule and its good faith exception by examining cases
where police officers' good faith in procuring and executing a search
warrant was the deciding issue as to whether the evidence seized un-
der the warrant was admissible.3 The Note then analyzes the four
parts of the decision in Hyppolite and concludes that the holding of
Hyppolite was consistent with precedent, but for the most part, was
not required by it.14 Finally, the Note concludes that although courts
have generally held that an individual does not forfeit constitutional
rights by asserting them, when the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule is applied, the reverse seems to be true.'5
In Hyppolite, officers from the Jacksonville Police Department
("JPD") in North Carolina suspected Steven Rodney of selling drugs
7. The probable cause standard comes from the text of the Fourth Amendment it-
self: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). Prob-
able cause means that after considering the totality of the circumstances, there is a "fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983).
8. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1157-58.
9. See id. at 1158.
10. See id. at 1157-58.
11. See infra notes 16-61 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 62-90 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 91-183 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 184-240 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 241-47 and accompanying text.
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to civilians and military personnel. 6 While executing a search war-
rant for Rodney's apartment, officers noticed a truck parked near the
apartment.17 The officers learned that the truck was registered to
Terveus Hyppolite in Miami, Florida. 8 After arresting Rodney and
seizing drugs from his apartment, the officers executed a "knock and
talk" canvassing in another area of town to try to locate Rodney's
"drug-trafficking associates."' 9 During this canvas, an officer noticed
Terveus Hyppolite in a yard outside a townhouse.' Hyppolite told
the officers his name and that he was visiting the owners of the town-
house, who were not at home.21 Commander Toth of the JPD arrived
and informed Hyppolite that he had become a target of investigation
because of his association with Rodney, and asked Hyppolite where
he worked." Hyppolite responded that he invested in stocks in Mi-
ami, but when questioned further, he "became very nervous." 3 Toth
next asked if there were any controlled substances in the residence.24
At this point, Hyppolite asserted that he would not say anything to
incriminate himself, and would not speak further without a lawyer.'
Hyppolite also refused to consent to a search of the residence, which
he now admitted was his." After this exchange, Hyppolite became
"loud and aggressive" and began to walk away, and Commander
Toth arrested him for resisting, obstructing, and delaying a police of-
ficer.' While Hyppolite was detained, Commander Toth and another
16. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1154. The officers, acting with federal, state, and county
law enforcement, had been investigating Rodney for several months. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. One of the officers recognized Hyppolite's name from an earlier investi-
gation of a shooting at a mobile home registered to Rodney. See id.
19. Iad The canvassing was prompted when a local security system installer, who was
inside Rodney's apartment at the time of the search, told the police that he had given
Rodney an estimate for an alarm system in a townhouse in another area of town. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. The officers knocked on the door of the townhouse and spoke with a
woman who said that she was also visiting. See Ud
22. See id. Hyppolite explained that he let Rodney borrow his truck. See id.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Idt Meanwhile, a detective recognized the car in front of Hyppolite's townhouse
as one he had previously seen in front of Rodney's apartment and subsequently followed
through Jacksonville. See id. at 1154-55. He informed Commander Toth that when he
followed the car, the car went to the house of a convicted drug dealer and he recognized
Hyppolite as one of the people in the car. See id. at 1155. The government later con-
ceded that Hyppolite could not have been in the car because he was in Miami at the time.
See id. at 1155 n.1. The district court found that the officer believed what he had seen
based upon objective facts and that the subsequent search warrant was not tainted by the
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officer went to obtain a search warrant. 28
Based on Commander Toth's affidavit outlining the above facts,
the county magistrate issued a search warrant for Hyppolite's town-
home.29 During the ensuing search, the JPD seized cocaine, drug
paraphernalia, and two guns." As a result of this evidence, Hyppolite
was indicted for various drug and weapon charges.3' Before trial, he
moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home. 2
The district court33 found that when the officers encountered
Hyppolite, no probable cause existed for a search warrant because
the facts merely supported a "hunch" that Hyppolite was involved
with Rodney's drug scheme.' Additionally, the district court found
that the mere fact that Hyppolite asserted his rights by refusing to
answer questions and refusing to consent to a search was not enough
to establish probable cause; therefore, the only remaining fact which
could have establishe probable cause was the manner in which Hyp-
polite asserted his rights.35 However, the district court neither ruled
whether the magistrate properly considered Hyppolite's manner
when granting the search warrant, nor whether the warrant was sup-
ported by probable cause 6 Instead, the court moved directly to the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Because the district
court believed that the Fourth Circuit had not explicitly ruled
whether the way in which a suspect asserts her constitutional rights
could properly be considered in a probable cause determination, the
court held that the officers could have relied in good faith on the
magistrate's resolution of this question.38 In short, the district court
kind of deliberate falsehood necessary for a violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
(1978). See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1155 n.1. Hyppolite did not appeal this ruling. See id.
28. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1155.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. The district court adopted the federal magistrate's recommended order. See id. at
1155 n.2. However, this order will be referred to as the district court's in order to avoid
confusion with the county magistrate who issued the search warrant. See id.
34. See id. at 1155.
35. See L
36. See id.
37. See id.; see also infra notes 44, 91-110 and accompanying text (describing good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule).
38. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1155-56. The district court stated that the officers
should not have been "'charged with the responsibility of second-guessing such legal
determinations.'" Id. at 1156 (quoting unpublished district court opinion). This language
was the source of one of Hyppolite's overruled objections. See id.; see also infra note 43
(describing basis of objection).
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held that the officer's reliance on the search warrant fell within the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and denied Hyppolite's
motion to suppress.3 As a result, the evidence seized from Hyp-
polite's home was used against him at trial and the jury found him
guilty of three drug offenses.4"
In a two to one decision,4' the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Hyppolite's motion to
suppress and affirmed his sentence.42 Hyppolite argued43 that the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because
Commander Toth's affidavit, upon which the search warrant was
based, was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no officer
could have reasonably relied on the magistrate's issuance of the
search warrant."' When considering this argument, the court stated
that the narrow issue before it was "whether a reasonably well
trained officer would have believed that a magistrate" could have
properly considered "Hyppolite's refusal to answer questions or to
consent to a search, his request for an attorney, and his nervousness
39. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1156.
40. The jury found Hyppolite guilty of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, one count of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one
count of using a firearm during a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See
id. at 1155. Hyppolite was sentenced to life imprisonment and a concurrent forty year
term. See id
41. See id. at 1154. Judge Russell wrote the majority opinion in which Judge Widener
concurred. See id. at 1154-60. Judge Hall wrote a dissenting opinion. See id at 1160-61
(Hall, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 1160.
43. The court of appeals also considered and rejected Hyppolite's claim that the dis-
trict court erroneously applied a subjective test to the officers' actions instead of the
proper objective test. See id. at 1156.
44. Id. at 1156-57; see also infra note 106 (describing the origin of this language in the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule). The district court never explicitly deter-
mined whether the search warrant was based upon probable cause. See Hyppolite, 65
F.3d at 1157. Under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), federal courts have the
option to apply either the good faith test or the probable cause test first. See id at 925;
see also United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Because we conclude
that the good faith exception applies, we need not address the question of whether [the
judge] had actual probable cause to issue the warrant."). Leon and the good faith excep-
tion generally have been criticized on the grounds that this option hinders the
development of Fourth Amendment law. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, "The Seductive Call
of Expediency:" United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L.
REv. 895, 930; William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 pas-
sim (1981). But see Sean R. O'Brien, Note, United States v. Leon and the Freezing of the
Fourth Amendment, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1305, 1307 (1993) (arguing that allowing courts to
decide the good faith issue first has not frozen development of Fourth Amendment law
and that courts still engage in rigorous analysis of Fourth Amendment values).
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and aggressive behavior while he asserted his rights" when granting
the search warrant.4
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion
that a suspect's mere assertion of constitutional rights cannot be the
sole basis to establish probable cause.4 Furthermore, the court held
that a reasonable officer should know this. The court also agreed
with the district court's conclusion that a previous Fourth Circuit de-
cision, United States v. Wilson,4 "left open" the different question of
whether the manner in which a suspect asserts constitutional rights
could be a basis for establishing probable cause.49 Due to this legal
uncertainty, the court rejected Hyppolite's argument and held that an
objectively reasonable officer could have relied on the magistrate's
legal determination of probable cause in this case. Because the
court concluded that the officers had acted in good faith, the court
affirmed the district court ruling and held that the evidence seized
pursuant to the warrant was admissible against Hyppolite
In addition to finding that the officers had acted in good faith by
relying on the magistrate's determination of probable cause, the
court also answered the question it believed was left open in Wilson:
Whether the form in which a suspect asserts constitutional rights can
properly be considered in determining probable cause." The court
explained that "although there may be some cases where the form of
a suspect's assertion of rights" could be a factor in support of a find-
ing of probable cause, it should not be "the prominent factor[]." 3
The court explained that "[t]he Fourth Amendment generally re-
quires more than an officer's interpretation of the reactions of an
uncooperative suspect to establish probable cause. '' 4
45. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1157.
46. See id. The court explained that "the Fourth Amendment would mean little if
officers could manufacture probable cause by asking questions until a suspect either con-
sents or exercises constitutional rights." Id.
47. See id.
48. 953 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
49. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1157.
50. See id. at 1157-58.
51. See id- at 1158.
52. See id.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. I& In addition to the exclusion issue, the court held the district court did not
commit clear error by converting the cocaine powder into cocaine base for sentencing
purposes, or by enhancing Hyppolite's sentence because he was an organizer or leader of
criminal activity. See id. at 1158-59. The court also held the district court did not abuse
its discretion by imposing a $300,000 fine. See i&. at 1159. Further, the court held that it
lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's refusal to depart downward from the sen-
612 [Vol. 75
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In his dissent, Judge Hall argued that it was unreasonable for the
officers to have relied on the magistrate's determination of probable
cause because "the warrant lacked sufficient indicia of probable
cause."' He emphasized that Commander Toth's belief that drugs
were in Hyppolite's home was completely based on Hyppolite's as-
sertion of his constitutional rights. 6  He also noted that "[a]
reasonable officer should know that a person's refusal to surrender
his rights is not evidence of wrongdoing."' Furthermore, Judge Hall
stated that unlike the "paradigm that prompted" the good faith ex-
ception, where a low-ranking officer relies on the "wise judgment" of
a magistrate, Commander Toth was a high-ranking officer "seeking
to exploit the remarkably inept judgment of the magistrate." '58 He
further chastised the majority for concluding that the officer's reli-
ance on the magistrate's determination was reasonable because there
was a possibility that in some "oddball" case, the assertion of consti-
tutional rights could be a factor in determining probable cause. 9 He
also stated:
The tattered old Fourth Amendment takes a beating when
its shield is raised by such a man [as Hyppolite]. But it
ought not be breached.
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safe-
guards of liberty have often been forged in
controversies involving not very nice people. '
Judge Hall would have vacated the conviction and remanded with
instructions to suppress the evidence. 1
In finding that the manner in which a suspect asserts her rights
cannot be the sole basis of probable cause for a search warrant, the
Fourth Circuit had to decide largely without the benefit of guidance
from the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has
never squarely addressed the issue of whether an individual's asser-
tion of constitutional rights can be grounds for probable cause for a
tencing guidelines based on Hyppolite's status as a deportable alien. See id. at 1159-60.
55. Id- at 1160 (Hall, J., dissenting).
56. See id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
57. Md (Hall, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 1161 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("I cannot rule out the existence of little
green men watching me from a distant planet; if I arranged my affairs as if they did, would
I be acting reasonably?").
60. See id. (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768
(1969)).
61. See id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
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search warrant. However, the Hyppolite court relied on the Supreme
Court's statement in Florida v. Bostick2 that "a refusal to cooperate,
without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justifi-
cation needed for a detention or seizure."' Because the minimal
level of objective justification, or "reasonable suspicion," is less de-
manding than the level of justification required to establish probable
cause,"4 the Court's statement in Bostick logically means that a mere
refusal to cooperate cannot constitute probable cause.
The Supreme Court has also indicated that citizens who refuse to
cooperate with public officials by asserting their Fourth Amendment
rights cannot be criminally prosecuted for doing so. For example, in
two cases, the Court held that refusing to admit a health inspector
into your residence without a search warrant could not be a criminal
act.' The Court reasoned that "[t]he right to privacy in the home
holds too high a place in our system of laws to justify a statutory in-
terpretation that would impose a criminal punishment on one who
does nothing more than" refuse to admit a health officer into her
62. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
63. Id. at 437; see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48-53 (1979) (holding that a
Texas statute which made it a crime to refuse to identify yourself when stopped by a po-
lice officer was unconstitutional when applied to a man who merely "refused to identify
himself and angrily asserted that the [police] officers had no right to stop him"). In Bos-
tick, the issue was whether a man who was waiting on a bus for it to depart was "seized"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he was questioned by two narcotics
agents. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431-33. The Court concluded that the appropriate in-
quiry was whether a reasonable person would have "felt free to decline the officers'
requests [to answer questions and search his bag] or otherwise terminate the encounter."
Id at 436. The Court made the statement that refusing to cooperate, without anything
more, does not justify a seizure in order to emphasize that Bostick could not have rea-
sonably believed that refusing to cooperate with the police would have given the police
grounds to question him further. See id at 437.
64. The less demanding standard of "reasonable suspicion" was first used by the Su-
preme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967). In Terry, the Court noted that when an
officer "is justified in believing that [an] individual whose suspicious behavior he is inves-
tigating" is dangerous, it would be "unreasonable" not to allow the officer to check
whether the person is in fact armed. Id at 24. Subsequent cases have interpreted Terry
as authorizing limited searches or seizures of suspects if the officers have a "reasonable
suspicion" of criminal activity. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)
(finding that police had reasonable suspicion to detain suspected drug courier for fifteen
minutes in an airport). In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), the Court explained:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only
in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is
different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause,
but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information less
reliable than that required to show probable cause.
Id. at 330.
65. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967); District of Columbia v.
Little, 339 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1950).
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home without a warrant.6'
The conclusion in Hyppolite that reasonable officers could not
be expected to know that the manner in which a suspect asserts con-
stitutional rights is an impermissible consideration was primarily
based on the perceived legal uncertainty left by a previous Fourth
Circuit case, United States v. Wilson.' In Wilson, the Fourth Circuit
considered whether a refusal to cooperate could constitute the rea-
sonable suspicion necessary for a "stop and question."" Wilson was
approached in an airport by officers engaged in monitoring passen-
gers.69 Wilson gave the officers permission to search his bag and his
person, but the searches recovered nothing incriminating." Wilson
then picked up his coats, and when one officer asked to search them,
he refused to consent and began to walk away.7 This began a cycle in
which the officer would ask Wilson to let him search, Wilson would
refuse and ask if he was being stopped, the officer would tell him he
was free to go, but then would begin the cycle again by asking Wilson
to let him search. n After this repeated questioning, Wilson finally
agreed to a search, but when the officer touched a bag in Wilson's
coat pocket, he grabbed the coat from the officer and ran." The po-
lice caught him and found approximately 115 grams of cocaine base
in the coat pocket.74 After being presented with these facts, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the "real reason"' for the persistent
questioning was Wilson's refusal to consent to a search of his coat."
The court also commended the government for avoiding the "obvious
pitfall" of claiming that Wilson's refusal to consent to the search was
a basis for a reasonable suspicion that Wilson was engaged in crimi-
66. Little, 339 U.S. at 7.
67. 953 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
68. Id. at 125-27.
69. See id. at 118.
70. See id.
71. See id
72. See id. at 118-19. Apparently, the officer was persistent in his questioning be-
cause the officer noticed a "bulge" in one of Wilson's coat pockets after asking Wilson for
permission to search three times. See id. at 119. Also, Wilson later began to raise his
voice and state that the officers were harassing him and that he was late for an appoint-
ment. See id.
73. See id. at 119.
74. See id. at 119-20.
75. I. at 125-26. Other suspicious behavior included Wilson's statement that he had
just come off a plane from Boston when the officers had seen him walk off a plane from
New York, and that when asked for identification, the only thing Wilson produced was a
check cashing card. See id. at 118, 125-26.
76. See id- at 125-26.
1997]
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nal activity.' Nevertheless, the court cautioned that "[w]e are not
prepared, however, to rule that the form of a denial can never be in-
cluded as a factor to be considered in determining whether an
investigative stop was justified."7' Even with this caveat, the court
found that Wilson's refusal to consent to a search played too much of
a role in the officer's determination that Wilson could be seized un-
der the reasonable suspicion standard. 9 Therefore, the court ruled
that the seizure was unlawful and the cocaine should have been sup-
pressed, noting that "[d]eterrence of police misconduct.., is well-
served by this ruling."'
In reaching its holding in Hyppolite that the mere assertion of
constitutional rights cannot constitute the sole grounds for probable
cause for a search warrant, the Fourth Circuit also relied upon deci-
sions from two other federal courts of appeals. In United States v.
Alexander,8 the Eleventh Circuit stated that "a defendant's refusal to
consent to a search cannot establish probable cause to search. A con-
trary rule would vitiate the protections of the Fourth Amendment.""
In a Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Prescott,3 a woman was in-
dicted as an accessory after the fact for mail fraud when a member of
a mail fraud scheme was found hiding in her home after she had re-
fused to admit officers who did not have a search warrant.m The
court held that the woman's "passive"" refusal to consent to a war-
rantless search is privileged conduct which cannot be considered as
evidence of criminal wrongdoing.' The court reasoned that citizens
would not voluntarily consent to searches if the government could
use this evidence against them, and therefore held that the woman's
77. Id. at 126.
7M Id.
79. See id at 126-27; see also supra note 64 (discussing the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard). The reasonable suspicion standard applied in Wilson because the officers were
merely monitoring the airport for suspicious activity. See Wilson, 953 F.2d at 118, 124.
80. Wilson, 953 F.2d at 127. The court also noted: "If ... police were permitted to
disregard a suspect's attempts to ignore further questioning and to persist until
'reasonable suspicion' was created or consent given, the Fourth Amendment would be
greatly diminished in its intended role as the bulwark against 'overbearing or harassing'
police conduct." Id. at 126 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968)).
81. 835 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir. 1988).
82. Id. at 1409 n.3.
83. 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978).
84. See icL at 1346-47.
85. After the agent told Prescott he did not have a warrant, "Prescott said nothing in
response but steadfastly declined to unlock her door." Id. at 1347.
86. See id. at 1351.
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refusal could not be admitted against her at trialY
At least one other federal court of appeals has implicitly recog-
nized that a suspect's mere assertion of a constitutional right cannot
constitute probable cause for a search. In United States v. Hill," the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration agent violated Hill's Fourth Amendment rights when the
agent requested that Hill accompany him to an office inside an air-
port after Hill twice refused to consent to a warrantless search. 9 The
court emphasized the government's implicit admission that refusal to
consent to a search cannot constitute probable cause.'
In Hyppolite, the evidence was admitted against Hyppolite be-
cause the court held that the evidence could be admitted under the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.91 The Supreme Court
established the good faith exception in United States v. Leon.9 In
Leon, police officers acted on an anonymous informant's tip that a
couple was selling drugs from their residence in Burbank, Califor-
nia.93 The officers observed activity corroborating the tip,94 and
further investigation led police to observe suspicious activities at Al-
87. See id. at 1351, 1353.
88. 626 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1980).
89. See id. at 437.
90. See icL at431,436-37.
91. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1158. The exclusionary rule requires evidence obtained
in an unconstitutional manner to be excluded. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-
55 (1961). The Supreme Court first enunciated the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383,393-94,398 (1914). The Court stated in Weeks:
If letters and documents can thus be seized [without a warrant] and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the
Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and
seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as
well be stricken from the Constitution.
Id. at 393. Although Weeks required evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment to be excluded, at the time Weeks was decided, the Fourth Amendment did not
apply to the states. When the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the exclusionary
rule did not apply to the states. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), overruled in
part by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). However, the Court later overruled
Wolf in Mapp, holding that the exclusionary rule also applied to evidence impermissibly
seized under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654-55. For a more
detailed chronicle of this history, see Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Be-
yond" The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-
Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1983).
92. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
93. See id. at 901.
94. The officers watched the house and saw several people, at least two of whom had
been involved in prior drug cases, enter the house and return with small packages. See id.
at 901-02.
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bert Leon's home as well.95 On the basis of this investigation, the of-
ficers procured a search warrant and seized a large amount of drugs
from several residences and automobiles.96 After conceding that the
case was a "close one," the district court suppressed the evidence,97
finding that the information supporting the warrant "was insufficient
to establish probable cause." '98 Holding that the evidence could be
admitted against Leon, the Supreme Court reasoned" that the pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct,'
but when a police officer acts in good faith and obtains a search war-
rant, there is no need for deterrence.' 1 Instead, the Court explained,
it is the magistrate's or judge's duty to determine whether the police
officer's information constitutes probable cause, and "[p]enalizing
the officer for the magistrate's error" does not contribute to the
"deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations."' 2 Nevertheless, the
Court explained that "the officer's reliance on the magistrate's prob-
able-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the
warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable."' 3 The Court then
listed four situations in which an officer's reliance on a search war-
rant would not meet the objectively reasonable standard and
95. See idL The police suspected Leon because one of the visitors to the original
house under surveillance listed Leon as his employer on his probation records, and Leon
himself had a prior record. See L at 901. The police also received a new anonymous tip
implicating Leon. See id- at 901-02. Upon investigation, the police observed "a variety of
... material activity" at Leon's home. See id. at 902.
96. See id The investigation led police to suspect drug activity was occurring at a
third address. See i Most of the drugs were seized from Leon's residence and the third
address; only a small amount was recovered from the house where the officers began their
investigation. See id.
97. Id. at 903. The court did not suppress all of the evidence because none of the
respondents had standing to challenge all of the searches. See id.
98. Id. Although the district court made clear that the officer who performed the
search had acted in good faith, it rejected the government's argument that the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule should not apply where evidence is seized on reasonable,
good faith reliance on a search warrant. See id. at 903-04.
99. The Court first summarily dismissed the suggestion that the exclusionary rule is
permanently attached to the Fourth Amendment. See L at 905-06. Instead, the question
of whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriate is a separate issue from whether a
person's Fourth Amendment rights were violated. See id. at 906 (citing Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213,223 (1983)).
100. See id. at 916.
101. See id. at 916, 920-21.
102. ld at 921. In short, the Court determined that "the marginal or nonexistent
benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on
a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclu-
sion." Met at 922.
103. Id
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suppression would be appropriate: (1) the magistrate is misled by
information which the police officer knew "was false or would have
known was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth";1°4 (2)
the magistrate has "wholly abandoned his judicial role";.. (3) the
warrant is based on an affidavit "'so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreason-
able' ,,;06 or (4) the warrant is "so facially deficient... that the
executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." ' 7
The question in Leon was whether suppression was appropriate
under the third prong of the new test.0 s The Court explained that the
officers' reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable because
they did not rely on a "bare bones" affidavit, and the divided opin-
ions of the lower courts demonstrated that the affidavit presented
enough evidence to "create disagreement among thoughtful and
competent judges as to the existence of probable cause."'0 9 There-
fore, the Court held that the exclusion sanction was inappropriate."0
Since Leon, the Supreme Court has applied and expanded the
scope of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in three
significant cases."' In the first case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard,"2 the
Court applied the Leon test and held that an officer had relied in
104. Id. at 923 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)).
105. Id. (citing Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319,326-28 (1979)).
106. Id (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring
in part)).
107. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988-91 (1984)).
108. See id. at 926.
109. Id. This language has created some disagreement among the federal circuit
courts concerning the proper reasonableness test to apply. In United States v. Hove, 848
F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[t]he test for rea-
sonable reliance is whether the affidavit was sufficient" to cause disagreement among
judges as to the existence of probable cause. Id at 139. The Eleventh Circuit has re-
jected this reading. In United States v. Taxacher, 902 F.2d 867 (11th Cir. 1990), it held
that the correct test is "whether the officer acted in objective good faith under all the
circumstances." Id. at 871 (relying on Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23 n.23). The latter test has
been adopted by the Fourth Circuit. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1156; United States v.
Clutchette, 24 F.3d 577, 581 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. George, 971 F.2d 1113, 1123-
24 (4th Cir. 1992).
110. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 926.
111. See Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185,1193 (1995).
112. 468 U.S. 981 (1984). This case was decided the same day as Leon. See id at 981.
For a more complete discussion of Sheppard, see John E. Fennelly & Steven K. Sharpe,
Commentary, Massachusetts v. Sheppard: When the Keeper Leads the Flock Astray-A
Case of Good Faith or Harmless Error?, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 665 (1984); Marc W.
McDonald, Note, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: United States v.
Leon; Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 27 B.C. L. REV. 609 (1986).
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good faith on a search warrant which was technically invalid.", In
Sheppard, the officer wished to search a residence for items related to
a murder, but the only form available on the Sunday when the officer
procured the warrant was a form for a search for controlled sub-
stances.1 The officer made some changes to the only available form,
and he showed these changes to the issuing judge.115 The judge made
additional changes to the form, but the resulting warrant still referred
to controlled substances and did not incorporate the officer's affida-
vit, and was therefore invalid."6 In holding that the good faith
exception applied, the Court explained:
Whatever an officer may be required to do when he exe-
cutes a warrant... we refuse to rule that an officer is
required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by
word and by action, that the warrant he possesses authorizes
him to conduct the search he has requested" 7
In Illinois v. Krull, the Court held that the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule applies to evidence seized pursuant to a state
statute which is subsequently ruled unconstitutional."' Pursuant to a
state statute, the officer in Krull inspected an automobile wrecking
yard without a search warrant."9 When conducting the inspection, he
discovered that three cars in the yard had been reported stolen., At
trial, the lower court suppressed this incriminating evidence because
it concluded that the statute authorizing the search was unconstitu-
tional.12 1 In reversing and expanding the good faith exception to
admit the evidence, the Court reasoned that suppressing evidence
seized under such a search would have little deterrent value.'2
113. See Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 985-86, 989-90. But cf. McDonald, supra note 112, at
640 (arguing that even technical constitutional violations cannot be tolerated).
114. See Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 985.
115. See id. at 985-86.
116. See id at 986-87.
117. Id. at 989-90.
118. 480 U.S. 340 (1987). For a more comprehensive discussion of Krull, see J. Donald
Hobart, Jr., Note, Illinois v. Krull: Extending the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule's
Good Faith Exception to Warrantless Searches Authorized by Statute, 66 N.C. L. REV. 781
(1988); Michael F. Kiely, Note, Illinois v. Krull: When Has the Legislature Wholly Aban-
doned its Responsibility to Enact Constitutional Laws?, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 411; see also
John S. Morgan, Comment, The Junking of the Fourth Amendment: Illinois v. Krull and
New York v. Burger, 63 TUL. L. Rav. 335, 375 (1988) (arguing that failure to suppress
evidence in Krull leaves businessmen without substantial Fourth Amendment rights in
commercial premises).
119. See KrulI 480 U.S. at 342-43.
120. See id. at 343.
121. See id. at 344.
122. See id. at 349. The Court in Krull set up a test very similar to the test enunciated
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Finally, in Arizona v. Evans' 3 the Court held that evidence
seized pursuant to an arrest resulting from an inaccurate computer
record created by court personnel should not be suppressed under
the exclusionary rule.24 In Evans, the respondent was pulled over for
a traffic offense; when the officer entered Evans' driver's license
number into the computer, it showed there was an outstanding mis-
demeanor warrant for his arrest." The officers promptly arrested
Evans, and in the search incident to the arrest, the officer found a bag
of marijuana." Later, the officers discovered that the arrest warrant
should have been quashed, but, due to an error in the clerk's office,
the computer record was inaccurate.27 The Court reasoned that the
good faith exception should be extended because suppressing the
evidence would have little deterrent effect on the clerk personnel."
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently used the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to admit evidence
seized pursuant to an invalid warrant.29 More specifically, in the four
in Leon: An officer cannot rely in good faith on a state statute if the legislature wholly
abandons its responsibility to enact constitutional laws when enacting the statute, or if the
statute's provisions are "such that a reasonable officer should have known that the statute
was unconstitutional." Id at 355. But see Kiely, supra note 118, at 444-45 (arguing that
this exception is inappropriate and useless when applied to a body the size of a legisla-
ture).
123. 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
124. See id. at 1193. For a more detailed discussion of Evans, see George M. Dery, III,
The Unwarranted Extension of the Good Faith Exception to Computers: An Examination
of Arizona v. Evans and its Impact on the Exclusionary Rule and the Structure of Fourth
Amendment Literature, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 61 (1995); Laura A. Giantris, Note, Arizona v.
Evans: Narrowing the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 55 MD. L. REV. 265 (1996); Robert
G. Manly, Note, Criminal Procedure-Evidence: Defining the Exclusionary Rule in the
Information Age, 72 N.D. L. REV. 167 (1996); Joseph H. Palmer, Jr., Note, Expanding the
Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Arizona v. Evans, 29 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 903 (1996); Steven A. Szymanski, Note, Exclusionary Rule-Good Faith Exception:
New Limitations on the Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence-Arizona v. Evans, 79
MARQ. L. REV. 1083 (1996).
125. See Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See iL at 1193. The Court also explained that court personnel have no stake in
the outcome of criminal prosecutions and that this type of error occurred infrequently.
See id
129. For example, the court used the Leon exception to allow evidence seized pursu-
ant to an invalid telephonic search warrant to be admitted in United States v. Clutchette,
24 F.3d 577 (4th Cir. 1994). In Clutchette, the court concluded that the warrant did not
violate the fourth prong of the Leon test; that is, the warrant was not so facially deficient
as to preclude reasonable reliance on its validity. See id. at 581-82. The warrant's only
defect was that it was not in writing as required under Maryland statutory law, and the
officer consulted with his superior and the state's attorney before he phoned the judge to
ask permission to search. See id. at 580-82. For other examples of Fourth Circuit applica-
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published Fourth Circuit decisions which hinged on the third prong
of the Leon test,' the court has always held that the officers relied in
good faith on the judicial determination of probable cause. In United
States v. Edwards,13' police seized marijuana pursuant to a search war-
rant based upon an affidavit which stated that "an informant" had
seen a large amount of marijuana in Edwards' house.' The affidavit
neither stated that the informant was a teenage boy who came out of
the house after the officers arrived, nor that the boy's concerned
mother had called the police station earlier in the day and prompted
the officers to go to the house. 33 However, the officer told the magis-
trate these facts when the officer applied for the warrant, and the
magistrate, not the officer, composed the affidavit."M Under the
North Carolina law at issue, information other than that contained in
the affidavit could not be considered by a magistrate issuing the war-
rant unless the information was recorded or contemporaneously
summarized in the record.35 In this case, the information was neither
recorded nor contemporaneously summarized in the record.136  De-
spite this flaw, the court reasoned that the officer's reliance on the
warrant was not so lacking in probable cause so as to render belief in
its existence unreasonable 37 because the officer could have believed
that any flaws in the affidavit were cured by his conversation with the
tions of Leon, see United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1314 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a search recovering shotgun shells was based on probable cause, but assuming argu-
endo that even if it was not, the officers acted in good faith under Leon) and United States
v. Tyler, 943 F.2d 420, 422 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that even if the Fourth Amendment
was violated when officers forcibly entered a man's home under authority of a claim of
judgment after the man refused to let them in, the officers' conduct came within the good
faith exception).
130. The third prong of the Leon test asks whether the search warrant was so lacking
in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer could rely upon it. See United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984); supra note 106.
131. 798 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1986).
132. See id. at 688.
133. See id. The Fourth Circuit held that it was unnecessary to resolve the question of
whether the warrant based on this affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause
because "the circumstances here clearly met the good faith exception of Leon." See id. at
690.
134. See id. at 687-90. Apparently, the court emphasized that the magistrate was the
person who drafted the affidavit in order to show that the magistrate was more at fault
than the officer. The court quoted the part of the Leon opinion which comments that
officers should not be penalized for the magistrate's error. See id. at 690-91.
135. See id. at 690.
136. See id.
137. See id. The court noted that the other three prongs of Leon were also not vio-
lated: the magistrate did not issue the warrant in reliance on a deliberately or recklessly
false affidavit, the magistrate did not abandon his neutral role, and the warrant was not
facially deficient. See id. at 690-91.
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magistrate." Consequently, the court reversed the motion to sup-
press. 9
In the second Fourth Circuit case which turned on the third
prong of the Leon test, United States v. George,1" the court did not
explicitly state that the search warrant was so lacking in indicia of
probable cause that no reasonable officer could rely upon it, but this
finding was implicit in its analysis. In George, the defendant was sus-
pected of shooting Dallas Rice and shooting at Sheriff Gaudet' 4 The
officers obtained a search warrant based on the facts that George was
found in the immediate vicinity of the Rice shooting shortly after it
occurred, he "spontaneously volunteered statements that betrayed
his knowledge of the crime," and the officers found discarded pieces
of a gun purchased by George near the crime scene.142 The district
court 143 concluded that the warrant was invalid because the affidavit
was "too scanty and too far removed in time to support a finding of
'present' probable cause."'" After dismissing the district court's con-
clusion that the Leon exception was inapplicable because the officers
had misled the issuing magistrate,45 the court held that the officers
"reasonably believe[d] that their conduct was fully consistent with
138. See id. at 690-92.
139. See id. at 692. The court also held that the district court had incorrectly applied a
subjective standard to the officer's action. See id.
140. 971 F.2d 1113 (4th Cir. 1992).
141. See id. at 1114-15. George was indicted for several racketeering counts including
two counts of conspiring to commit murder in aid of racketeering. See id. at 1116.
142. Id. at 1124. The affidavit on which the search warrant was based stated:
"George was found and located in the immediate vicinity at or near the time...
Dallas P. Rice was shot and is a suspect in the shooting. The affiant has also
personally observed rifles in said residence, and the said Cyrus J. George has
been observed test firing high powered rifles within close proximity to the above
described residence."
See id. at 1115 (quoting affidavit in support of search warrant).
143. The federal magistrate actually decided this issue, but the district court adopted
the federal magistrate's findings "in totality." See id. at 1116-17. The holding is referred
to as the district court's in order to avoid confusion.
144. Id. at 1116 (internal quotations omitted). This conclusion was apparently based
upon the realization that the officer who wrote the affidavit supporting the search warrant
had seen the rifle in George's residence five years before the crime. See id. at 1123 n.15.
145. The federal magistrate seems to have concluded that the officers violated the first
prong of Leon by making a misrepresentation to the magistrate who issued the warrant.
See id. at 1122. The federal magistrate found that the officers used the warrant, which
was issued upon evidence related to the Rice shooting, as a "subterfuge" to search for
incriminating items from the Gaudet shooting. See id. In contrast, the court of appeals
believed the subterfuge theory lacked foundation because the officers could have been
looking for evidence of both crimes. See id. at 1123 n.16. Furthermore, the court of ap-
peals explained that the subjective motivations of the officers were irrelevant under
Leon's "objectively reasonable" standard. See id. at 1123.
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the Fourth Amendment.""' The court based this conclusion on the
strong facts underlying the affidavit and therefore reversed the por-
tion of the district court's order which suppressed evidence found in
George's residence. 47
In United States v. Lalor'4 and United States v. Legg,149 the
Fourth Circuit held that officers relied in good faith on warrants
which failed to state a specific nexus between the alleged illegal ac-
tivity and the place to be searched. In Lalor, the court specifically
stated that the warrant was invalid, 5 but quickly concluded that the
warrant was not so lacking in probable cause that the officers could
not rely upon it because the lower court judges disagreed on the
subject."' In Legg, the court moved directly to the question of
whether the officers acted in good faith, and relying on Lalor, held
that the affidavit was not "so lacking in indicia of probable cause"
that the officers could not have reasonably relied upon it.' How-
ever, the court in Legg went on to explain that even if the affidavit
itself was insufficient, under United States v. Edwards,13 the court
could consider the officer's contemporaneous oral statements to the
magistrate." 4
Like the Fourth Circuit, other federal courts of appeals have
typically held that police officers who seized evidence pursuant to a
search warrant acted in good faith and thus satisfied the Leon re-
quirements,'55 especially when the issue was whether the warrant was
so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer
could have relied upon it.'56 For example, in United States v. Taxa-
146. Id. at 1124.
147. See id. The court was also persuaded by the facts that the officers consulted with
the county prosecutor before applying for a warrant, the affidavit contained no false
statement, and the warrant narrowly defined the scope of the search. See id.
148. 996 F.2d 1578 (4th Cir. 1993).
149. 18 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 1994).
150. Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1583.
151. See icL at 1582-83. This reasoning appears contrary to the test most often used in
the Fourth Circuit-whether the officer acted in objective good faith, not whether judges
could disagree as to the existence of probable cause. See supra note 109 (describing stan-
dards for the reasonableness test).
152. See Legg, 18 F.3d at 243.
153. 798 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of Edwards, see supra notes 131-39
and accompanying text.
154. See Legg, 18 F.3d at 243-44.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 3 F.3d 69, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1993); United States
v. Howard, 991 F.2d 195, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. McLaughlin, 851 F.2d
283, 284-85 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d 991, 996-97 (7th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292,297-98 (6th Cir. 1985).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Riedesel, 987 F.2d 1383, 1391 (8th Cir. 1993); United
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cher,1 7 the court held that police officers relied in good faith on a
warrant even though the government conceded that there was insuf-
ficient evidence for probable cause."' Taxacher was stopped for
speeding and the officer became suspicious when he noticed that the
rental car that he was driving should have been returned three weeks
earlier.159 When the officer asked Taxacher questions about his origin
and destination, Taxacher gave inconsistent answers and "grew in-
creasingly nervous." 6' The officer then asked Taxacher's permission
to search the car; he orally agreed, but refused to sign a consent
form. 6' When the officer attempted to search the trunk, Taxacher
stood in front of him so that the officer could only peer inside.'62
Then, when the officer asked Taxacher what was inside a satchel he
observed,' Taxacher "really and truly looked like he was going to
faint," slammed the trunk shut, and said there would be no further
search without a warrant.' Under these circumstances, the court
held that the subsequently granted search warrant was not so lacking
in probable cause so as to render the officer's belief in its existence
unreasonable.1" The reasonableness of the officer's belief that prob-
able cause existed was reflected in his consultation with the district
attorney prior to procuring the warrant as well as Taxacher's unbe-
lievable explanations of his itinerary, his "excessive nervousness,"
and his unusual behavior of consenting to a search but revoking it
when the officer focused his attention on the satchel.'" Thus, the dis-
trict court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress was
affirmed. 67
Although courts have often allowed evidence seized under a
States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 222-23 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Taxacher, 902 F.2d
867, 873 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Bishop, 890 F.2d 212, 216-18 (10th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d 991, 994-96 (7th Cir. 1987).
157. 902 F.2d 867 (11th Cir. 1990).
158. See id. at 870-71.
159. See id at 869. Taxacher said he had received an extension and he showed the
officer a receipt, but the receipt did not state whether the rental agreement had been
extended. See id The officer did not include Taxacher's explanation in his application
for the search warrant, and later investigation revealed that Taxacher bad been telling the
truth. See id. at 870 n.1.
160. Id. at 869.
161. See id.
162- See id.
163. See id The satchel contained $186,626 in cash and Taxacher was charged with
one count of money laundering and two counts of violating the Travel Act. See id. at 870.
164. Id. at 869.
165. See id. at 873.
166. Id. at 872-73.
167. See id. at 873.
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subsequently invalidated search warrant to be introduced because the
officer acted in good faith, this is not always so. Federal courts have
suppressed evidence when the officers violated the first prong of
Leon and misrepresented or omitted facts when seeking the war-
rant'6 and when the warrant was granted on the basis of evidence
from a prior illegal search.
169
Also, some courts have held that search warrants violated the
third prong of Leon because the warrants were so lacking in indicia
of probable cause that no reasonable officer could have reasonably
relied upon them.' For example, in United States v. Turner,' a war-
rant to search for evidence of Turner's gambling operation was
granted on the basis of an affidavit which recited a tip from an infor-
mant whose information had "been reliable and substantiated by
168. See, e.g., United States v. Baxter, 889 F.2d 731, 734 (6th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Cody, 812 F. Supp. 1123, 1125-26 (D. Colo. 1993), affd, 21 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Alexander, 740 F. Supp. 437, 448 (N.D. Ohio 1990); United States v.
Solomon, 728 F. Supp. 1544, 1549-50 (S.D. Fla. 1990); United States v. Stout, 641 F. Supp.
1074, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 1986); United States v. Boyce, 601 F. Supp. 947, 954 (D. Minn.
1985); see also United States v. Ruiz, 822 F. Supp. 708, 713-14 (D. Kan. 1993) (holding
that even when the misleading character of the officer's affidavit was corrected, the affi-
davit was still so lacking in probable cause that no reasonable officer could have relied
upon it).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1987); United States
v. McQuagge, 787 F. Supp. 637, 657 (E.D. Tex. 1991), affid sub nom. United States v.
Malloy, 8 F.3d 23 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Villard, 678 F. Supp. 483, 490-93
(D.N.J. 1988), affd, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d
690, 694 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Leon exception does not apply unless the court
finds that an objectively reasonable officer could have believed information contained in
affidavit requesting search warrant was lawfully obtained); United States v. Adams, 845
F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that good faith exception did not apply
because officers should have known that their original search was illegal and that warrant
based on this evidence was therefore invalid).
170. See e.g., United States v. Leake, 998 F.2d 1359, 1367 (6th Cir. 1993) (rejecting
reliance on warrant based solely on an anonymous tip which was not corroborated by any
suspicious activity); United States v. Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1151 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that officers could not rely on warrant when there was virtually no nexus be-
tween investment business cards and a warrant to search for bonds); United States v.
Hove, 848 F.2d 137, 139 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting reliance on warrant which did not state
why police believed incriminating evidence would be found at the particular place to be
searched); United States v. Wright, 811 F. Supp. 1576, 1584-85 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (finding no
good faith reliance where affidavit merely stated that first search did not uncover all of
the evidence it should have); United States v. Cochran, 806 F. Supp. 560, 566 (E.D. Pa.
1992) ("No police officer could reasonably conclude that all nude pictures of children
without limitation were illegal."); see also United States v. Andrews, 713 F. Supp. 1319,
1320-22 (D. Minn. 1989) (holding that Leon did not apply where search warrant was too
broad due to the officers' failure to discover that property which resembled a single home
was really two separate apartments).
171. 713 F. Supp. 714 (D. Vt. 1989).
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independent investigation in the past."' The informant described
the betting procedure, provided Turner's unlisted phone number,
said Turner determined betting odds by calling Florida daily, and said
that collections were delivered to Turner on Tuesdays."7 In addition,
corroboration of the tip revealed that the phone number was correct
and that the previous month's phone bill was $1400.74 The court held
that not only was the affidavit insufficient to establish probable
cause, but Leon's good faith exception would not allow the incrimi-
nating evidence to be introduced because "a reasonably well trained
officer would have known that more was needed to establish prob-
able cause."175 Furthermore, the fact that the officer consulted two
attorneys was not enough to show his good faith. 6 Consequently, the
court granted the defendant's motion to suppress, noting that
"suppression is in accordance with the deterrent function of the ex-
clusionary rule."'
Another example of a federal court holding that a search war-
rant was so lacking in probable cause that an officer did not act in
good faith in relying upon it is United States v. GrangerY8 In
Granger, a correctional officer was murdered, and a search warrant
to extract blood from the defendant17 was granted based on an affi-
davit outlining the following facts: A confidential informant saw
Scott Fountain wearing a blue zippered sweatshirt and hurrying from
172. Id. at 715.
173. See id.
174. See iL
175. Id. at 722. The court explained that the officer should have known that the mere
statement that the informant had been reliable in the past was insufficient and that more
verification of the tip was required; the court believed the high telephone bill and unlisted
number were not suggestive of illegal activity. See id. at 718-19, 722. Additionally, to
further investigate the tip, the officers could have easily waited until the "collection day,"
only one day after the warrant was executed, to see if a large number of people entered
Turner's house. See iL at 719 n.5.
176. See iU at 722-25. When the officer asked the first attorney to review the applica-
tion for the warrant, the attorney asked if there was additional information which "could
bolster the credibility and reliability of the informant." Id at 723. The officer responded
that such information existed but he did not want to jeopardize another ongoing investi-
gation. See id The attorney then told him that the affidavit "had merit as it stood," and
the second attorney told him the warrant was satisfactory. Id The court reasoned that
the conversation with the first attorney put him on notice that more information was re-
quired, and by choosing to protect the other investigation instead, the officer's reliance on
the warrant was undermined. See id. at 724-25.
177. Id. at 725.
178. 596 F. Supp. 665 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
179. See id. at 666. Three defendants were charged, including Matthew Granger and
Scott Fountain. See id Despite the case name, the Fourth Amendment issue in this case
involved defendant Fountain. See id. at 666-67.
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the area of the murdered man's office approximately three hours be-
fore he was killed; later that day, a blue zippered sweatshirt was
found bloodstained in a bathroom stall; and blood was noticed on the
doorknob to Fountain's cell a short time after the murder." The
court held that the affidavit lacked probable cause because there was
little evidence the informant was reliable,81 there was no indication
Fountain was anywhere near his cell when the blood was found on his
doorknob, and the warrant did not explain why the agent believed
Fountain's blood "would be of evidentiary value." '12 Relying on
these conclusions, the court held that the affidavit was so lacking in
indicia of probable cause that the agent could not in good faith have
relied upon it, and that the results of the blood test had to be sup-
pressed."8
In United States v. Hyppolite, the Fourth Circuit had to consider
whether an individual's assertion of constitutional fights can consti-
tute sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant," and also
whether a warrant so issued would fall under the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule." The holding addressing these issues can be
divided into four parts: (1) the mere fact that a suspect asserts his
fights cannot constitute the sole basis for probable cause; ' (2) the
manner in which a suspect asserts his fights cannot be a prominent
factor in the probable cause determination;' (3) whether a magis-
trate could consider the manner in which a suspect asserts his rights
was left uncertain by United States v. Wilson;.. and (4) the uncer-
tainty left by Wilson allows the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule to apply, permitting the unconstitutionally seized
180. See id. at 667.
181. See id at 669. The court reasoned that because the confidential informant was
another inmate, it would have been to his advantage to describe Fountain as the person
wearing a sweatshirt like the one found blood-covered, especially if the informant was the
sweatshirt's true owner. See id. Furthermore, the officers had not taken any steps to
corroborate that the blue sweatshirt was Fountain's. See id. at 669-70.
182. Id at 670. The court commented that the affidavit did not set forth any facts that
Fountain had blood or cuts on him, or that whoever killed the correctional officer would
have been cut, either of which could have demonstrated how Fountain could have bled on
the doorknob. See id.
183. See id. at 671.
184. For an examination of the background law on this issue, see supra notes 62-90 and
accompanying text.
185. For discussion of the good faith exception and its application, see supra notes 91-
183 and accompanying text.
186. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1157.
187. See id. at 1158.
188. See id. at 1157-58. For a discussion of Wilson, see supra notes 67-80 and accom-
panying text.
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evidence to be admitted in this case.189 The first conclusion in Hyp-
polite, that a suspect's mere assertion of constitutional fights is
insufficient to establish probable cause, was virtually compelled by
precedent. The court in Hyppolite not only relied on the Supreme
Court's statement in Florida v. Bostick"' that a refusal to cooperate
cannot constitute grounds for a seizure, but also relied on its own
precedent in Wilson-the government would have fallen into an
"obvious pitfall" if it had asserted that the officers of the JPD had
established probable cause merely by claiming that Hyppolite refused
to consent to a search of his home.191 Additionally, as the court stated
in Hyppolite, "[T]he Fourth Amendment would mean little if officers
could manufacture probable cause by asking questions until a suspect
either consents or exercises constitutional rights."' 2 Therefore, this
portion of the Fourth Circuit's decision was consistent with precedent
and Fourth Amendment values of preventing police misconduct.
The second portion of the Hyppolite holding, namely, that
"officers and magistrates cannot rely solely on the form in which a
suspect asserts constitutional fights to establish probable cause for a
search warrant," was also consistent with precedent.193 Although the
precedent in this area was less clear,94 any other conclusion would
have made the protection granted in the first part of the holding illu-
sory. If the court had concluded that the mere assertion of
constitutional fights could not constitute probable cause, but that the
manner of asserting fights could, officers could always claim that sus-
pects asserted their rights in a suspicious manner.'95 Therefore, the
court's conclusion in Hyppolite that "[t]he Fourth Amendment gen-
erally requires more than an officer's interpretation of the reactions
of an uncooperative suspect to establish probable cause"'96 was true
to both precedent and to the spirit of the first part of its holding.
189. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1157-58.
190. 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) ("[A] refusal to cooperate, without more, does not fur-
nish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure."); see
supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
191. United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 126 (4th Cir. 1991).
192. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1157. Nevertheless, because the court ultimately allowed
the evidence to be admitted under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, Hyp-
polite was indeed penalized for asserting his rights; his house was searched and the
evidence recovered was used against him. See id. at 1155-56.
193. IL at 1158.
194. See id, at 1157-58.
195. Cf. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(illustrating that virtually any behavior can be viewed as suspicious by examining courts'
application of the drug courier profile).
196. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1158.
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The court's application of the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule in the fourth part of the Hyppolite decision was not
surprising when cast against the background of previous cases. In the
majority of cases, federal courts have held that police officers relied
in good faith on search warrants, even when the courts concluded
that the underlying search warrants were based on less than probable
cause.'" In fact, when federal courts have held that an officer's ac-
tions do not meet the Leon standard, it is usually because the officer
made misrepresentations to the issuing magistrate"' or because the
warrant clearly lacked probable cause.199 As previously noted, the
Fourth Circuit has never held that an officer's reliance did not meet
the third prong of the Leon test.2 In that sense, the result in Hyp-
polite was completely predictable.
Unlike the first two portions of the Hyppolite holding, where the
conclusions were both consistent with and arguably compelled by
precedent, the court's application of the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule was consistent with precedent, but was not required
by it. For example, Hyppolite is consistent with the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Taxacher31 the case most factually similar to
Hyppolite. In Taxacher, the court held that an officer relied in good
faith on a search warrant granted primarily because Taxacher became
very nervous and quickly withdrew his consent to a search of the
trunk of his car.202 However, the facts in Taxacher were distinguish-
able from those in Hyppolite because Terveus Hyppolite never
consented to a search, whereas Taxacher did. 3 Further, the officers
in Hyppolite did not consult an attorney before procuring the war-
rant, unlike the officers in Taxacher.' Therefore, the result in
Taxacher can be distinguished from the holding in Hyppolite.
Similarly, Hyppolite is not out of step with Leon or the Supreme
Court's subsequent applications of Leon, but the Fourth Circuit's
conclusion in Hyppolite was not required by those cases. Leon and
its progeny are the result of a policy decision that officers should be
197. See supra notes 155-56 (listing cases).
198. See supra note 168 (listing cases).
199. See supra notes 169-70 (listing cases).
200. See supra text accompanying note 129.
201. See United States v. Taxacher, 902 F.2d 867 (11th Cir. 1990); see also supra notes
157-67 and accompanying text (describing holding in Taxacher).
202. See Taxacher, 902 F.2d at 872-73.
203. See id. at 869. The fact that Taxacher consented to a search but then withdrew his
consent when the officer focused on one item was probably more suspicious than Hyp-
polite's consistent refusal to consent to a search.
204. See id. at 870.
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deemed to have acted in good faith when the warrant they acquire is
later ruled invalid due to circumstances beyond their control. In the
three cases following Leon, the fact that the warrant authorizing the
search was later deemed invalid was clearly beyond the officer's con-
trol. In Sheppard ,25 the officer had no control over which search
warrant form was available and he "took every step that could rea-
sonably be expected" of him by attempting to correct the warrant
himself, telling the issuing judge about the difficulty, and watching
the judge make changes.2 In KrullY the officer had virtually no
control over the laws passed by the legislature;o8 by performing the
search he was simply doing his job.29 Likewise, in Evans,210 the officer
had no control over the clerk's office and its ability to keep its com-
puter records updated.2 ' The reasoning behind these decisions is that
when a warrant is invalid due to circumstances beyond an officer's
control, excluding the evidence does not deter Fourth Amendment
violations.
Unlike the situations in Sheppard, Krll, and Evans, in the typi-
cal search warrant application process, as in Hyppolite and Leon,
212
the question of whether a search warrant is valid is mostly within the
officer's control. By investigating thoroughly and presenting the in-
formation to the issuing magistrate in an articulate way, the officer
asserts control over the process and can be held accountable if the
warrant is later ruled to be based upon less than probable cause.
Suppressing evidence obtained by such searches adds to the deterrent
value of the exclusionary rule and furthers the policy goals behind the
Fourth Amendment.
Although the situation in Leon was more within the officer's
control than in the facts presented in the three key Supreme Court
cases that followed it, the officers in Leon still completed all that
205. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); see supra notes 112-17 and ac-
companying text (describing Sheppard holding).
206. See Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989.
207. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); see supra notes 118-22 and accompanying
text (describing holding in Krulo.
208. That is to say, as one citizen who could cast a vote, he had some minimum effect
on the laws passed by the legislature, but he had no personal involvement in drafting the
law.
209. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 342-43.
210. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995); see supra notes 123-28 and accompany-
ing text (describing holding in Evans).
211. See Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193.
212. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see supra notes 92-110 (describing
holding in Leon).
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could reasonably be required of them. In Leon, the officers engaged
in an "extensive investigation" before seeking the warrant, and the
district court acknowledged that the question whether probable cause
existed "was a close one."2 '3 In contrast, in Hyppolite, the police had
only begun their search for Rodney's drug associates when they en-
countered Hyppolite,214 and the government "apparently conce[ded]"
that there was no probable cause.2" Therefore, the facts of Hyppolite
were distinguishable from those in Leon, and the same result was not
required. In short, because the officers in Hyppolite did not perform
all that could reasonably be expected of them, it would have pro-
moted Fourth Amendment values to suppress the evidence they
recovered from Hyppolite's home.
As with Supreme Court precedent, none of the Fourth Circuit's
prior cases which applied the Leon good faith exception compelled
the result in Hyppolite, even though the result followed the court's
propensity to hold that officers acted in good faith. In Edwards,26
Lalor,2 7 and Legg,218 the search warrants were invalidated on some-
what technical grounds, and not because the warrants were issued on
less than probable cause. In Edwards, the search warrant was invalid
because the magistrate did not include everything the officer told him
in the affidavit which accompanied the warrant,2" and in Lalor and
Legg, the warrants were invalid because they did not state a sufficient
nexus between the criminal activity and the place to be searched."
213. Leon, 468 U.S. at 901,903.
214. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1154.
215. Id. at 1155; cf. United States v. 18 Perkins Rd., 774 F. Supp. 699, 708 (D. Conn.
1991) (holding that government's concession that there was no probable cause for certain
items in the search warrant made reliance on the warrant objectively unreasonable).
216. United States v. Edwards, 798 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1986); see supra notes 131-39 and
accompanying text (describing holding in Edwards).
217. United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578 (4th Cir. 1993); see supra notes 148, 150-51
and accompanying text (describing holding in Lalor).
218. United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 1994); see supra notes 149, 152-54 and
accompanying text (describing holding in Legg).
219. See Edwards, 798 F.2d at 691. Although the court found it unnecessary to con-
sider whether the warrant was based upon probable cause, and instead directly applied
the good faith exception, the court remarked, "[w]ithout question, had the affidavit in-
cluded the additional information gleaned from the officers' investigation, it would have
been sufficient to establish probable cause." Id. at 689-90.
220. See Legg, 18 F.3d at 243; Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1582-83. In Legg, the court moved
directly to the good faith exception and did not determine whether the warrant was inva-
lid. See Legg, 18 F.3d at 243. However, the court in Legg explained that even if the
affidavit itself was insufficient, the court could consider the officer's contemporaneous
oral statements to the magistrate. See id. at 243-44.
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The situation in United States v. George"M is most comparable to the
situation in Hyppolite because in both cases the issue was whether the
officers could have reasonably relied on a warrant which was based
on an arguably low amount of incriminating evidence.2 Neverthe-
less, George can be distinguished from Hyppolite on the grounds that
there was more tangible evidence against George than there was
against Hyppolite at the time the warrant was issued. The police
found George in the relatively deserted area where the first shooting
occurred shortly after it happened, they recovered pieces of a gun
consistent with the one used in the shooting near the scene, and they
determined that the gun was purchased by George." Conversely, at
the time the warrant for Hyppolite's townhouse was issued, the police
only knew that he loaned his truck to a person who had drugs in his
apartment and suspected that he had been in a car which traveled to
the home of a convicted drug dealer.24 Due to these differences, the
court could have reasonably concluded that the officers in George
acted in good faith reliance while the officers in Hyppolite did not.22
In addition, if the Fourth Circuit had ruled that the officers in
Hyppolite had not relied on the search warrant in good faith, they
would not have been in uncharted waters. As evidenced by the
holdings in Turner. and Granger,27 some federal courts are not ad-
verse to finding that officers did not act in good faith even where
there was considerable incriminating evidence to support the war-
rant.2
221. 971 F.2d 1113 (4th Cir. 1992); see supra notes 140-47 and accompanying text
(describing holding in George).
222. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1156-57; George, 971 F.2d at 1116, 1123-24. Indeed, one
of the incriminating pieces of evidence against George was his suspicious statement when
the police encountered him: "'I don't have any guns. Go ahead and search my truck ...
I didn't hear any shots.'" George, 971 F.2d at 1115 (quoting statement of defendant).
This could be likened to Hyppolite's statements that he "would not say anything to in-
criminate himself." Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1154-55.
223. See George, 971 F.2d at 1114-15.
224. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1154.
225. Another factor leading to the conclusion that the officers in George acted in good
faith is that they consulted a county prosecutor before applying for the search warrant.
See George, 971 F.2d at 1124.
226. United States v. Turner, 713 F. Supp. 714 (D. Vt. 1989); see supra notes 171-77
and accompanying text (describing holding in Turner).
227. United States v. Granger, 596 F. Supp. 665 (W.D. Wis. 1984); see supra notes 178-
83 and accompanying text (describing holding in Granger).
228. In Granger, there was blood on the defendant's doorknob, and officers learned
from a confidential informant that the defendant was wearing a sweatshirt the night of the
murder which was subsequently found covered with blood. See Granger, 596 F. Supp. at
667. In Turner, the warrant was based on a detailed tip from an anonymous informant
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Unlike the other three parts of the decision in Hyppolite, which
are consistent with precedent even if not required by it, the third por-
tion of the court's holding is a manipulation of precedent. When
holding that the manner in which a suspect asserts his rights should
not be a prominent factor in a probable cause determination, the
court makes two questionable propositions: (1) this was unclear after
its holding in United States v. Wilson;22'9 and (2) reasonable officers
would not know this.2'
The Fourth Circuit assumed in Hyppolite that police officers are
familiar with the court's holding in United States v. Wilson.2" The
court explained in Wilson that in addition to Wilson's refusal to con-
sent to the search, "the officers were faced with a young man who
denied having come off the New York shuttle, who had glanced back
a few times, and who, when requested, produced an identification
card and [initially] consented to a search."' The court accordingly
held that the manner in which Wilson asserted his rights was weighed
too heavily against him and the evidence which was recovered had to
be suppressed.' Therefore, if the officers were familiar with the
holding in Wilson, they should have been on notice that the form in
which a person asserts constitutional rights cannot play a prominent
role when determining that a person may be guilty of a crime .' Yet,
instead of following this logic, the court in Hyppolite curiously relied
on only one sentence in the opinion when it found that the rule es-
tablished in Wilson was unclear. The court relied on its statement in
who had proved to be reliable in the past. See Turner, 713 F. Supp. at 715. Also, the tip
was partially corroborated; the unlisted phone number was correct and Turner had a
phone bill of $1400, supporting the informant's claim that Turner placed long distance
calls daily. See id. In addition, the officers in Turner consulted two attorneys before pro-
curing the warrant. See id. at 723.
229. 953 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1991); see supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text
(describing holding in Wilson).
230. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1157-58; see also id. at 1160 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("A
reasonable officer should know that a person's refusal to surrender his rights is not evi-
dence of wrongdoing.").
231. See id. at 1157-58. The court assumed the officers were familiar with the ruling
because it cited Wilson for the proposition that officers should know that asserting consti-
tutional rights cannot be the sole basis for probable cause. See id. at 1157. Furthermore,
the Hyppolite court stated that officers could believe the law was unclear as to whether
the form of asserting constitutional rights could be considered in determining probable
cause after the holding in Wilson. See id.
232. Wilson, 953 F.2d at 126.
233. See id. at 126-27.
234. This is especially true because in Wilson the officers were unable to meet the
lesser "reasonable suspicion" standard and in Hyppolite more incriminating evidence
would be required in order to meet the higher probable cause standard. See supra note 64
(describing reasonable suspicion standard).
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Wilson that it was not prepared "'to rule that the form of a denial
[could] never be included as a factor to be considered in determining
whether an investigative stop was justified.' "23' The court apparently
failed to recognize that even if it was uncertain how this sentence
would apply in future cases, the way it applied to the facts in Wilson
was clear. Because the court failed to analyze the entire Wilson
opinion, and instead relied on one sentence to hold that the law was
unclear, the court's holding that the officers reasonably relied on the
warrant is less convincing.
A further comparison of the Wilson and Hyppolite cases shows
another way in which the Hyppolite court was not true to the Wilson
decision. In Wilson, the court held that there was insufficient evi-
dence for the officers to have a "reasonable and articulable
suspicion" that Wilson was criminally involved 7 because "[w]hen [a]
person's consent is withdrawn... something more than a hunch is
required before the person's freedom may be inhibited."2'8 In Hyp-
polite, the district court stated that when the officers encountered
Hyppolite, the officers only had a "hunch" that Hyppolite was in-
volved in criminal activity.2"  It is difficult to understand why a
"hunch" plus a refusal to consent to a search could not equal a
"reasonable suspicion" of criminal acts in Wilson, but an officer could
reasonably believe that a "hunch" plus a refusal to consent to a
search could equal probable cause in Hyppolite.24
235. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1157-58 (quoting Wilson, 953 F.2d at 126).
236. As Judge Hall noted in his dissent:
The majority pins its decision on a premise that it ultimately rejects-that Hyp-
polite's pugnacious manner of asserting his rights might provide probable cause.
Because we did not rule out this premise for all time and all contexts in Wilson,
the majority concludes that a reasonable officer might have thought it valid. All
that we did in Wilson was decide a case or controversy, which is all we ever do,
and all we are doing today.
Id. at 1160-61 (Hall, J., dissenting).
237. Wilson, 953 F.2d at 126-27.
238. Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
239. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1155.
240. See supra note 64 (describing the difference between the reasonable suspicion
standard and the probable cause standard). The court also failed to observe another dif-
ference between the two cases which could have undercut the officer's good faith reliance.
In Wilson, the defendant consented to a search of his person and bag, but then refused to
allow the officer to search his coat. See Wilson, 953 F.2d at 118. In Hyppolite, Hyppolite
never consented to a search of his home. See Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1154. Surely this is
less suspicious than allowing an officer to search some items but then refusing to allow the
officer to search others, especially when the item is something as impersonal as a coat.
But cf. United States v. Taxacher, 902 F.2d 867, 872-73 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that offi-
cer could rely in good faith on warrant procured in part due to suspect's suspicious
behavior of consenting to search but then revoking consent when officer focused on a
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In Hyppolite two lines of case law intersected: The case law pro-
tecting citizens who assert their constitutional rights and the case law
applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Although
the Fourth Circuit attempted to remain true to both lines of prece-
dent, when forced to decide, the court chose to manipulate the
Wilson holding in order to admit the evidence under the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. Despite its best efforts to disguise
its message by manipulating Wilson, the unfortunate conclusion is
that when the good faith exception competes with protecting citizens
who assert their constitutional rights, the good faith exception wins.241
The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Hyppolite
should cause concern for all citizens interested in protecting their
Fourth Amendment rights for at least two reasons.242 As mentioned
above, the first concern is that the Fourth Circuit seemingly believes
that admitting evidence is more important than protecting the pri-
vacy of citizens who assert their rights. Second, the concern is real
because the court refused to lay down a bright line rule that the way a
person asserts his rights can never give police a reason to conduct a
search. Instead, the court preferred to set up a standard which might
allow police to consider the way a person asserts her rights, 43 believ-
ing in the existence of an "oddball" case where a suspect's manner
could play a proper role in a probable cause determination.2 ' The
court's hesitancy to lay down a bright line rule can only be explained
by a presumption that only people who are guilty will adamantly as-
sert their rights. Yet, even the district court in Hyppolite recognized
that" 'courts and judicial officers should be reluctant to sanction any
conduct that rests on the premise that only the guilty wish to protect
particular satchel).
241. The Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule has been sharply criti-
cized. As one scholar wrote: "In effect, the Court maintains that searches pursuant to
defective warrants violate the Fourth Amendment, but that nothing happens when such
violations take place." Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 934 (1986).
242. In addition, there is a third concern, but it only applies to future guilty criminal
defendants. This concern is: If the court's open-ended holding that the assertion of rights
cannot be a "prominent" factor in evaluating probable cause is considered in conjunction
with the good faith exception, the result will likely be that some other criminal suspect
will be searched because of the way he asserted his constitutional rights. Then, contra-
band or incriminating evidence will be recovered, but the officers will be found to have
acted in good faith, and the contraband will be admitted. This only applies to guilty de-
fendants because nothing incriminating would be recovered from an innocent person.
243. The court sets up a standard by stating that the form of asserting constitutional
rights cannot be the "sole" basis for determining probable cause or a "prominent" factor.
Hyppolite, 65 F.3d at 1158.
244. See id. at 1161 (Hall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 75
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
their homes from police searches.' ,,245 In sum, the standard set out in
Hyppolite can only lead to searches of innocent people and subse-
quent litigation.46
The decision in Hyppolite suffers from another anomaly. The
law normally encourages citizens to assert their rights, but Terveus
Hyppolite was penalized for doing so. If Hyppolite had simply lied
when Commander Toth asked him if there were controlled sub-
stances in his residence, the Commander would probably have been
unable to obtain a search warrant. Therefore, Hyppolite actually for-
feited his rights by asserting them and by failing to be dishonest.
Even though the court attempted to preclude this result in future
cases, this was the result for Terveus Hyppolite.
If the court had struck a different balance between the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule and the protection of citizens
who assert their constitutional rights, Terveus Hyppolite would have
been the incidental beneficiary. If the court had stated a bright line
rule that police cannot consider the way a citizen asserts constitu-
tional rights when calculating probable cause, someone like
Hyppolite would probably benefit in the future. Nevertheless, this
should not be an argument against doing so, because as Justice Jack-
son once wrote:
[The Fourth Amendment] often may afford a shelter for
criminals. But the forefathers thought this was not too great
a price to pay for that decent privacy of home, papers, and
effects which is indispensable to individual dignity and self-
respect. They may have overvalued privacy, but I am not
disposed to set their command at naught.24'7
Unfortunately, it appears the Fourth Circuit was disposed to set the
245. Id. at 1160 (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting unpublished district court decision). The
presumption that only the guilty will passionately assert their rights is also unfortunate
because "if one has witnessed and lived with the oppression of governmental power or
experienced the impact of governmental authority on individual liberty" one may be
more likely to become passionate when confronted by an authority who is infringing upon
his substantive rights. See Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshal- Taking the Fourth
Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723,725 (1992).
246. Cf. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Because the strongest advocates of Fourth Amendment rights are frequently criminals,
it is easy to forget that our interpretations of such rights apply to the innocent and guilty
alike." (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 290 (1983) (Brennan. J., dissenting))). Un-
less policemen go door to door and see who refuses to consent to a search the most
vehemently, the police can always argue that they were relying on something besides the
form of the assertion of constitutional rights when they applied for a warrant.
247. United States v. Harris, 331 U.S. 145, 198 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting), over-
ruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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forefathers' command at naught.
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